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What (a) to do about ‘impact’: a Bourdieusian critique 
 
Helen Colley, University of Huddersfield, UK 
Presented in the keynote symposium ‘Radical social theory for radical times: putting Bourdieu to 
work in educational research’ convened by Helen Colley at the British Educational Research 
Association Conference, University of Manchester, 4 September 2012. 
 
Educational research in the UK faces some fundamental challenges today.  We work in radical times: 
a period of deep global economic crisis, harsh national austerity measures, the intensification of 
neo-liberal policies, and grossly increasing socio-economic inequalities.  These trends are putting 
educational research under pressure through restricted funding, the reshaping of research council 
agendas, and demands for ‘impact’
1
 to show ‘value for money’ (ESRC, 2009; HEFCE, 2011).  In his 
presidential address to the annual conference of the British Educational Research Association, John 
Gardner (2011) presented his response to this situation, focusing on how the 'impact' of our work 
might be improved.  Notwithstanding a number of caveats in his address, he directed warnings at 
the educational research community that we are too inward-looking, and that our work is often not 
accessible enough to generate influence with policy-makers, the media and the general public.   
Amongst these warnings, Gardner made two key arguments that I highlight here.  First, he stated 
that impact among ‘policy makers, influencers and implementers in national, regional and local 
bodies…would be evidenced by their using our research to inform their work’ (p.547).  His central 
question is: ‘does our work have the desired impact on the thinking and practice of these various 
groups?’ (p.547).  If this begs the question of what or whose desires are at stake here, this is clarified 
later on, calling for us to ensure that our research ‘“chimes” with the reasonable expectations and 
aspirations of the audience, without pandering to any inappropriate bias or partial interest’ (p.556).  
The government dismissal of the Cambridge Primary Review is given as an example of ‘political 
idealism’ which is clearly presented as unreasonable, but in a way which treats this as an exceptional 
aberration on the part of policy-makers: the charge of failing to ‘chime’ with reasonable 
expectations of research users remains levelled against the broad educational research community, 
leaving us with an implied assumption that policy makers’ and implementers’ expectations are 
usually 'reasonable'. 
Gardner’s second major target in explaining inadequate impact is not only that educational research 
is often too complex, but that ‘[in] the pursuit of the holy grail of theory, [researchers] also lose sight 
of alternative, simple and more plausible propositions’ (p.557, emphasis added).  He considers 
                                                          
1
 Throughout this paper, I use the word ‘impact’ in inverted commas to denote its socially constructed 
definition in the terms of HEFCE’s REF and research council strategy papers.  When used without inverted 
commas, I use it largely to denote the broader meaning of influence which researchers might wish their work 
to have. This too is socially constructed, of course, but I would argue without necessarily incorporating the 
powerful political and economic interests that imbue ‘impact’. 
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‘much educational research to be burdened by a pursuit of theory that is inappropriate to the 
circumstances’ (p.557): 
But will the work have the spark of critical and innovative thinking that will make it shine and 
give it true impact?... [The] answer will often be ‘No’. (p.558) 
We therefore need to ‘reduce our dependence on established orthodoxies and pseudo-theories’ 
(p.558).  Indeed, the ‘keystone elements’ of ‘most definitions of theory’ are held to be 
‘generalization, explanation and prediction’ (p.558).  Once again, despite a range of caveats and 
Gardner’s own concession that his view ‘may not be popular’ (p.558), a series of charges are 
levelled, apparently at non-positivist research, although it remains unclear exactly who or what is 
being targeted.   He acknowledges that: 
Some may agree with me and some may disagree.  This is entirely healthy. It reflects a 
community that is not content to have a single worldview but flourishes in debate and 
change.  (p.544) 
This paper, then, seeks to contribute to the debate Gardner has raised.  There is in his address an 
element of reprise of the ‘paradigm wars’ launched by Hillage et al. (1998), Tooley and Darby (1998) 
over a decade ago.  Others have responded amply to the attempted imposition of this ‘new 
orthodoxy’, refuting the notion of atheoretical research, and defending pluralism within the 
educational research community (for a robust example, see Hodkinson, 2004).  I do not intend to re-
engage with those particular debates here.  What I do wish to argue is that the matter of ‘impact’ 
cannot be reduced to the simple propositions advanced by Gardner, and that in order to understand 
‘impact’ (and the impact of ‘impact’) more deeply, not only theory but radical social theory is 
essential.  
Such an approach demands a reflexive sociology which can extend radical doubt to problematise the 
myriad preconstructed ideas – ‘impact’ being but one example – that surround us and order our 
practices in socially regulated ways: a sociology of social science itself, such as that advanced by 
Pierre Bourdieu (e.g. Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992).  This calls for the systematic critique of 
‘reasonable expectations’ held by powerful social groups, especially when they seek to constrain the 
nature of educational inquiry; and for research that is relevant precisely because it disturbs 
expectations and engages in political struggle against the social injustices which are currently being 
intensified by policy-makers in the UK and around the world.   
The first section of this paper, then, reviews current debates about the research ‘impact’ agenda.  
The second outlines Bourdieu’s theoretical framework, and his concept of illusio, as a framework 
with potential for offering critical insight into that agenda.  The third and fourth sections give an 
account of research I conducted with colleagues about the youth support service Connexions, 
illustrating the application of illusio to generate deeper understandings of practitioners’ experiences; 
and of its reception by key audiences identified by HEFCE and the research councils as targets for 
‘impact’.  The last main section analyses this narrative of ‘impact’ also through a Bourdieusian 
theoretical lens applying the concept of illusio, before ending with some brief reflexive conclusions 
about the impact of ‘impact’ and the responses educational researchers and their representative 
scholarly bodies might make. 
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The debate about ‘impact’ 
There has been widespread debate in the media and internet among academics about the 
introduction of ‘impact’ into Research Council criteria, now also emerging in academic journals. 
There is strong support for the ‘impact’ agenda, as in Gardner’s (2011) presidential address. The 
argument tends to be posed in the following way: how can any academic reasonably object to an 
expectation that their research will have a positive impact on society and that they should be able to 
demonstrate this – especially when it is funded by public money?  Some persuasive arguments are 
presented by nursing professor Brendan McCormack (2011), who advances a theory of ‘engaged 
scholarship’ that demands commitment on the part of both researchers and users to ‘integrate the 
doing and using of research in practice’ (p.111).  He views the impetus from HEFCE as positive 
opportunity to maximise such engagement. 
However, there is also strong opposition to this agenda (see for example Brooks, 2011; Fazackerly, 
2012, with subsequent reader comments running to almost 20 pages).  McKibbin, an Oxford don and 
social historian  writing in the London Review of Books, states bluntly that ‘There is everything wrong 
with Hefce’s [sic] notion of impact’ (p.3), and shows that rhetorical claims of breadth of definition for 
‘impact’ are not backed up by the rest of their documentation on REF criteria.  He describes the REF 
as ‘a bureaucratic machine running out of control’ (p.6); and argues that in fact the main purposes of 
the ‘impact’ agenda are to ‘establish tighter political control of the universities’ (p.6) and further 
their creeping privatisation.   
It is notable that such opposition comes not only from the ‘soft’ disciplines such as arts, humanities 
and social sciences, but also from the ‘hard’ disciplines of science and technology.  Parker and 
Teijlingen (2012) write as professors of social work, acknowledging that applied research in their 
field should indeed contribute to the enhancement of well-being and the improvement of services.  
They nevertheless point out the considerable difficulties – time-consuming, costly and possibly 
impracticable – of demonstrating such impact.  More significantly, they argue that theoretical and 
philosophical research also play a vital role in this field, but are placed under threat by the ‘impact’ 
agenda: 
It must be remembered, however, that [the requirement to demonstrate ‘impact’] is 
ideologically driven, associating research with a tangible outcome perhaps rather than 
simply increased knowledge and understanding. It may seem, on the surface, important and 
a victory for common sense (whoever determines this), but it promotes one specific view of 
research only. […] [Should] outcome-focused research be the only type supported, the 
sector is likely to lose those deeper understandings and meanings that have developed and 
now permeate practice. Indeed, it may be that such theoretical research has engendered 
practice cultures that have positively changed lives.  (Parker and Teijlingen, 2012: 43-44, 
emphasis added) 
In particular, they warn that it would be dangerous for ‘conceptual, theoretical and critical “thorn-in-
the-side” research to be marginalised or suppressed (p.48). 
This latter concern is echoed by Brown (2010), who points to: 
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…the tension between participatory or critical research and ‘pragmatism’ that restricts the 
types of question asked, prefers surface description and evaluation to ‘what is really going 
on’, has a superficial quasi-quantitative view of qualitative data gathering and analysis, and 
avoids engaging in the political contested nature of research. (p.245, citing Trinder, 1996) 
Indeed, Reisz (2010), reporting a seminar for participants in the REF ‘impact’ pilot, noted claims that 
some universities were reluctant to submit research that was ‘controversial or critical of 
government’ (p.6), even where it had had demonstrable impact. 
These critiques are deepened by Oxford University ethnographers Mills and Ratcliffe (2012), who 
argue that social research has become colonised by the ‘cultural circuits’ of capitalism (citing Thrift, 
2005).  Models of academic production have been increasingly shaped by business theory (see also 
McKibbin, 2010), and the demand for ‘impact’ as a measurement of the economic value of research 
has a number of consequences: 
The push for efficiency within the circuit potentially squeezes the unpredictable, the 
tangential and the creative. […] Increasingly the public and the market are seen as the best 
arbiters of useful knowledge, via new structures that offer proxies of quality and status, such 
as citation indexes and university rankings. One might argue that this leads to a crisis of 
academic community and audience. Academic work is less engaged with intellectually, even 
as it circulates more widely. […]  [T]hese new circuits discourage a sustained investment of 
thought or time by academics. They favour intellectual dexterity, quick responses to 
emergent funding opportunities and intellectual multi-tasking. The premium placed on 
planned and programmed deliverables is reworking older scholastic horizons. Academic time 
is increasingly defined by Gantt charts […] rather than long-term speculative research. It is a 
productivity focused on predictability. (Mills and Ratcliffe, 2012: 152) 
Their argument once again implies that it is critical research that may become excluded from the 
field – research which may not ‘chime’ comfortably with powerful research-users’ expectations.  It 
also goes some way to answering Parker and Teijlingen’s (2012) question about who determines the 
‘common sense’ that is supposed to prevail in the ‘impact’ agenda.  As McKibbin notes, ‘The 
assessment of impact will be made by panels the “majority” of whose members will come from the 
“user community”’ (2010: 3); at the same time, he questions sharply how certain of these users 
might assess research that is not to their political liking or supportive of their own business interests. 
In order to offer further critical insights into this debate, I turn next to outline some key elements of 
Bourdieu’s radical social theory which can be usefully applied. 
Bourdieu’s sociology 
In one respect, Bourdieu may share common ground with presidential address by Gardner (2011) 
that we began with.  Bourdieu was vehemently opposed to abstract theoreticism, to theory-for-
theory’s-sake, divorced from the concrete realities of everyday lives, and from the empirical data 
through which we can understand those lives.  However, he was equally vehemently opposed to 
methodological technicism and sectarianism, and to the ‘scientific myopia’ which arises from 
unthinking reliance on research instruments and ‘absence of theoretical vision’ (Wacquant, 1992: 
28).   
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Instead of a continued separation between […] two poles mitigated only by intensified 
interaction, Bourdieu advocates the fusion of theoretical construction and practical research 
operations.  (Wacquant, 1992: 34). 
Bourdieu was also emphatic about the necessity for researchers to grapple with the complexities of 
social life, and to engage in unsettling political critique.  This poses him in some opposition to 
Gardner’s call for simple propositions chiming with the expectations and desires of dominant social 
groups.  As Wacquant (1992) explains, complex though it may render our research, we have to take 
seriously the organic and relational nature of Bourdieu’s sociology, and its core principle of 
dissolving entrenched binaries of subject/object, structure/agency, and micro/macro-level analysis.  
Otherwise, there is a strong danger, seen especially in Anglophone work, of fragmenting and 
therefore misreading and de-radicalising Bourdieu’s oeuvre.  This is particularly noticeable with 
regard to his concepts of social and cultural capital and of habitus, with the latter all too often used 
to ‘bestow[] gravitas without doing any theoretical work’ (Reay, 2004). 
It is impossible to undertake within the remit of this paper a comprehensive review of Bourdieu’s 
sociology (see e.g. Rawolle and Lingard, in press; Grenfell, 2008, for fuller accounts).  Here, then, I 
focus on the conceptual ‘thinking tools’ most fundamental to his theory-as-method, those of habitus 
and field, and on the notion of illusio or ‘interest’.  This latter concept has been largely neglected and 
sometimes misused in the application of Bourdieu’s sociology (Costey, 2005), and has rarely been 
applied in educational research. Widin’s study of international English language education projects 
(2010) is the only educational example that utilises it centrally, in her analysis of neo-colonial 
domination and subordination in such projects.  Yet it is an essential tool in Bourdieu’s thinking, 
since (in his later work at least) it is the primary way in which he expresses the interaction of habitus 
and field (Costey, 2005; Wacquant, 1992).  Inevitably, for heuristic reasons, I leave aside other 
important concepts such as symbolic capitals, which themselves contribute to the organic whole of 
this theoretical framework, risking the danger of which I have already warned by this omission.  
However, I would argue that the case I do make would be the richer for, rather than contradicted by, 
their inclusion. 
Reay (2004) offers a succinct account of habitus as a multi-layered nexus of human dispositions and 
pre-dispositions, drawing out its various characteristics: its social and embodied nature, entailing 
both thought and feeling; its operation as agency, though bounded; its collective nature, shaped by 
classed, gendered and racialised histories; and the interplay of past and present in both its durability 
and its permeability: 
…habitus can be viewed as a complex internalized core from which everyday experiences 
emanate. Choice is at the heart of habitus, which he likens to `the art of inventing' 
(Bourdieu, 1990a, p. 55), but at the same time the choices inscribed in the habitus are 
limited. I envisage habitus as a deep, interior, epicentre containing many matrices. These 
matrices demarcate the extent of choices available to any one individual. (Reay, 2004: 435) 
As such, habitus entails both structure and agency, both objective and subjective aspects of our 
experience.  Its theoretical counterpart is the concept of ‘field’, inseparable as the ‘other side of the 
coin’ of habitus.  Wacquant emphasises this interdependence of the two concepts:  
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 …both of [Bourdieu’s] key concepts of habitus and field designate bundles of relations.  A 
field consists of a set of objective historical relations between positions anchored in certain 
forms of power (or capital), while habitus consists of a set of historical relations ‘deposited’ 
within individual bodies in the form of mental and corporeal schemata of perception, 
appreciation and action. (1992: 16, original emphasis) 
Yet even this particular definition of the conceptual pairing, taken alone, can lead to a widespread 
misunderstanding of their relationship.  All too often, habitus is taken to focus on the subjective, 
human element, whilst field is taken to focus on the objective, structural context in which human 
experience and action are located (see, for example, Grenfell and James, 1998: 15).  This can risk re-
dichotomising habitus and practice from fields and capital, and mistaking objective relations 
between positions – that is to say, sets of social relations – as objective relations between things 
(e.g. Rawolle and Lingard, in press).   Imperfect as it is by Bourdieu’s own admission, his use of the 
metaphor of a game to illuminate what he means by ‘field’ is crucial to understanding that this 
frequent misinterpretation, which tends to treat habitus as agency (however constrained) and field 
as structure, is incorrect.  A field is not only a set of given external conditions which have themselves 
been socially devised or imposed - like the rules and the pitch or court in soccer or tennis – but is 
also the agentic and partly subjective playing of the game through our habitus.  The field, as ‘a space 
of conflict and competition’ (Wacquant, 1992: 17), is constructed only through the human doings of 
human beings.  
It is not only difficult to keep hold of this essentially dialectical relationship between habitus and 
field, with both concepts expressing structure as well as agency (Golsorkhi et al., 2009); it is also 
difficult to grasp precisely the articulation between them, as Warde (2004) notes.  He argues that a 
return to the concept of practice in Bourdieu’s earlier work is necessary, but in doing so he dismisses 
a pivotal concept in Bourdieu’s later work which I believe does elucidate their interaction: that of 
‘interest’ or illusio. 
Bourdieu’s concept of illusio: articulating habitus and field 
For Bourdieu, the field-as-game operates not so much according to explicit rules as tacit 
‘regularities’.  Within the game, players use their capital and strategies to make moves, take 
positions, seek to position others, play to win, and/or play to transform the game and its immanent 
rules: 
Thus we have stakes (enjeux) which are for the most part the product of the competition 
between players. We have an investment in the game, illusio (from ludus, the game): players 
are taken in by the game, they oppose one another, sometimes with ferocity, only to the 
extent that they concur in their belief (doxa) in the game and its stakes; they grant these a 
recognition that escapes questioning.  Players agree, by the mere fact of playing, and not by 
way of a ‘contract,’ that the game is worth playing, that it is ‘worth the candle,’ and that this 
collusion is the very basis of their competition.  (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 98, original 
emphases) 
The concept of illusio is therefore quite distinct from that of ‘illusion’ (Costey, 2005). Habitus 
socialises people to feel their illusio simply as ‘acting sensibly’ (Bourdieu, 1992a: 66).  As with the 
concept of practice, which Bourdieu argues is not largely intentional, utilitarian or a matter of choice 
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but rather an instinctive sensibility, so also he views illusio as part of a deeply somatized feel for the 
game, although perhaps somewhat closer to awareness than our more unconscious immersion in 
the doxa of the field (Wacquant, 1992).  Widin (2010) alerts us to three key aspects of how illusio 
plays out.  First, not only do different groups orient themselves to different interests to the field, but 
the interests of some will dominate others.  Second, dominant groups tend to hide their interests 
beneath a ‘disavowal of interest’.  Third, it is therefore necessary to discern the actual stakes that 
apparently disinterested players are pursuing, beyond their rhetorical declarations about the objects 
they value.   
What is at stake for illusio is constituted by those objects that are considered of value in the field; 
typically, these may take the form of the various capitals – social, cultural and economic – that can 
be accumulated, circulated and exchanged.  But investment in a game like education or educational 
research may also be an investment in ‘hidden, non-material profits’ (Wacquant, 1992: 26) such as 
values and broader social purposes: all the more reason for probing beneath apparent ‘disinterest’. 
Changes in a field driven by powerful groups therefore often entail changes to its stakes, devaluing 
those pursued by subordinate groups (Bourdieu, 1984).  This is in part effected through ‘officializing 
strategies’ which aim to engender regularity of practice.  The object of such strategies is to 
‘transmute “egoistic”, private, particular interests… into disinterested, collective, publicly avowable, 
legitimate interests’ (Bourdieu, 1977: 40).  At the same time: 
The sense of good investment […] dictates a withdrawal from outmoded, or simply 
devalued, objects, places or practices and a move into ever newer objects in an endless drive 
for novelty… (Bourdieu, 1984: 249) 
This process serves to marginalise and denigrate anyone who fails to identify with the new ‘general 
interest’ that has been manufactured as the only reasonable one, reducing dissidents to mere 
individuals and making them appear unreasonable.  
Bourdieu associates this process with fetishism (Wacquant, 1992), in the Marxist sense of that word: 
an extreme form of reified thinking which represents an object’s attributes as natural and intrinsic 
whilst obscuring the social relations which underpin its production and are reproduced through its 
functioning (Allman, 2007).  As Harvey explains the fetish (2010), what we produce socially becomes 
hidden within a cipher which then takes on the status of a ‘fact of nature’ (p. 41).  ‘[W]e are 
perpetually at risk of being ruled by fetishistic constructs that blind us to what is actually 
happening…’ (p.47), but Harvey emphasises (as does Bourdieu) that this is not a mere illusion: ‘the 
surface appearance, while fetishistic, always indicates an objective reality’ (p.46).  Fetishism de-
historicises social practices, abstracts the political from the material, fragments related phenomena, 
and obscures the social nature of human relations (Carpenter, 2011).  Dominant interests imposed 
on the field, then, cloaked as ‘reasonable’ interests, and demanding the investment of illusio by all, 
can be seen as a prime example of the fetish. 
The injustice of such changes to the field is compounded by the ‘hysteresis’ of habitus – similar to 
Marx’s notion that consciousness lags behind reality.  Bourdieu (1984: 142) argues that this 
hysteresis causes ‘previously appropriate categories of perception and appreciation’ to be 
inappropriately applied to the new state of the field; and that this effect is worse for groups 
occupying disadvantaged positions.  The holders of devalued ‘goods’ thus have their position 
worsened by continuing to ascribe value to them, but this is not an entirely pessimistic situation: 
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These phenomena of individual and collective misrecognition are in no way illusory, since 
they can orient real practices, especially the individual and collective strategies aimed at 
establishing or re-establishing the objective reality of the value of the [goods], and these 
strategies can make a real contribution toward actual revaluation. (Bourdieu, 1984: 143) 
Indeed, though inability (for whatever reason) to invest one’s illusio in the dominant stakes 
engenders a lack of fit between habitus and field, leading to alienation and exclusion, it may also 
create a far clearer perception of the game and its rules by virtue of that rupture (Bourdieu and 
Wacquant, 1992: 173).  This offers some hope of collective resistance and struggle. 
Having worked with Bourdieusian theory in educational research for some time, my attention was 
only drawn to the significance of the concept of illusio recently by one of my doctoral students, 
Frédérique Guéry, who had encountered its more frequent use in the new critical studies of 
translation and interpreting (e.g. Inghilleri, 2005).  As I was trying to make sense of the data from a 
project funded by the ESRC about the shifting roles, identities and practices of youth support 
workers in the now-defunct Connexions Service, and she was studying the emergence of public 
service interpreting as a fragile new profession, we found ourselves looking at common issues 
experienced by both groups of practitioners: the difficulties of workplace learning in a context of 
severely inadequate resources, and the emotional and ethical pressures under which they laboured.  
A sense of dislocation and disillusionment with the fields in which they were employed led us to 
work with the concept of illusio in our analyses, and enabled us to situate the deep personal crises 
arising for some practitioners in a much broader, social understanding of what was happening.  I go 
on next, then, to give an abbreviated account of the project on youth support workers, which has 
been reported in depth elsewhere (Colley, Lewin and Chadderton, 2010a; Lewin and Colley, 2011; 
Chadderton and Colley, 2012; and Colley, 2012), to illustrate the application of illusio in its analysis 
(for an extended version, see Colley, 2012), before discussing the ‘impact’ of the project and 
interpreting it through the same theoretical lens. 
Youth support workers: a case of shattered illusio 
In exploring ‘career histories’ through narrative interviews with 26 youth support workers who had 
different lengths of experience in Connexions, and with some who had quit the service because of 
their disagreements with its implementation, our research was undertaken in a context of repeated 
infrastructural change over the previous 15 years.  Indeed, unprecedented upheaval had occurred 
with the formation of the national multi-professional Connexions Service in 2001 and its devolution 
to local authorities in 2008 – a move followed by the withdrawal of its funding entirely in 2010.   
The newly-founded Connexions Service was promoted vigorously by the New Labour government as 
‘the best start in life for every young person’ (DfEE, 2000) and as a ‘holistic’ one-stop-shop dedicated 
to supporting the most disadvantaged youth through long-term trusting relationships with their own 
Personal Adviser, as well as continuing to offer universal career advice and guidance to all young 
people.  Many of the practitioners we interviewed talk about their commitment to these ideals: it 
was a ‘stake’ in which they had been enthusiastic to invest their illusio.  But whether ‘old hands’ or  
relatively new recruits, almost all felt thoroughly disillusioned by their experiences by the time we 
conducted our fieldwork in 2008, and we were inundated with volunteers responding to a request 
for a small number of research participants prepared to talk about why they had left the service.   
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There were several main reasons for this disillusionment.  The first related to a severe lack of 
resources: at best, only around half the number of staff promised by the government were ever 
recruited.  As a result, Personal Advisers (PAs) had excessively large caseloads, lowering the quality 
of their work, deskilling them through lack of time for professional development, and – perhaps 
most significantly – forcing them to make choices about which young people they could work with, 
and which they had to neglect, as they simply could not see them all.  In addition to this, they felt 
under strong pressure by their managers, themselves responding to government targets, to act in 
ways they considered wholly unethical.  As the main target for Connexions’ funding was to remove 
as many young people as possible from the ‘NEET’ category (not in employment, education or 
training), PAs were pressured to avoid spending time with youth facing the greatest difficulties, and 
who were therefore unlikely to enter or sustain a placement in education, training or employment.  
Instead, they were told to concentrate on young people more likely to move out of ‘NEET’ status in 
the short term.  In addition, they were also pressurised to submit clients to whatever opportunities 
were available, regardless of their vocational appropriateness, in order to get them off the ‘NEET’ 
register.  Others were obliged to engage in ‘creative accounting’ measures to demonstrate that 
unfeasible targets had in fact been met.  This result in a great deal of emotional labour and ethics 
work (Colley, 2012) for them.   
Most of the PAs we talked to had attempted to protest about these pressures to their managers, but 
had been met at best with indifference, at worst with intimidation and denial, and, in a couple of 
cases, the termination of their contracts.  Some of our respondents withdrew their data for fear of 
reprisals, despite our provisions to ensure confidentiality.  A considerable number had become ill 
physically and /or mentally because of the conflicts they encountered in this situation.  Some had 
left Connexions for health reasons, others because they were simply not prepared to tolerate the 
conflicts any longer.  The disjuncture between the ‘goods’ they valued and the interests of 
government and managers became untenable.  Their illusio was so shattered that they could no 
longer remain in the field.  Our findings resonated strongly with those of Dejours (2009) and Pezé 
(2010) on contemporary workplaces in France.  They argue that the pressures of ‘hyperproductivity’ 
(Pezé, 2010) driven by economic competition, alongside pressures to behave unethically in contexts 
of restricted resources, are creating intense social and psychological dislocation for employees; but 
that voices raised against these trends within the workplace are routinely met with denial, 
‘institutional lies’ and the threat of dismissal from their jobs (Dejours, 2009). 
Continuing to read this data through the theoretical lens of illusio, we can see how the government 
promoted Connexions in a ‘disinterested’ way: its ‘object of value’ was supposed to be one of 
meeting the needs of all young people, especially the most disadvantaged, and doing so through a 
holistically caring service.  Yet the government’s actual rather than rhetorical interest could be seen 
as reducing public welfare spending in the interests of the most powerful players in the economic 
and political fields.  First, it drastically reduced previous spending on career guidance, youth work 
and other youth support services through the under-funding and under-staffing of Connexions, 
disguising this as an inevitable ‘fact of nature’ in the prevailing economic situation.  Second, by 
enforcing targets focused on ‘NEET’ reduction in this context, this de facto worked to exclude the 
neediest young people from access to services and support.  The target of ‘NEET’ reduction became 
an ‘officializing strategy’, a fetish which acted to enforce particular practices and abstract young 
people and their status from the social and economic distress imposed on them.  A third interest, 
one could argue, was to withdraw funding for such support altogether (as has now happened) whilst 
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simultaneously making it appear that young people and Connexions practitioners were to blame for 
the service’s failures.  Unable to overcome the hysteresis of habitus which continued to bind 
practitioners to an illusio of caring for young people, PAs engaged in largely individual strategies to 
protest and resist.  But the power of the officialising strategy marginalised them, positioning them as 
unreasonable trouble-makers or ‘dead wood’ incapable of adapting to new (and supposedly better) 
approaches to youth support, and forcing significant numbers out of the field – with many others 
being forced out two years later by redundancy when funding was withdrawn altogether. 
How, then, did we try to create impact for our research, and how were those efforts received? I 
begin with my own narrative of efforts to gain such impact.   
Failure of ‘impact’ – or refusal of ‘impact’? 
Like many other researchers in applied social sciences (see, for example Parker and van Teijlingen, 
2012; Grenfell and James, 2008), our research was strongly committed to user engagement and to 
making a positive impact in the field in which we were working.  Key stakeholders were involved 
from the start in the development of the research proposal and design, and in the on-going work of 
the project, through an advisory group. Well-established networks among policy makers, 
implementers, practitioners and their trade unions were used to announce the launch of the project 
and to disseminate interim findings throughout and after its conduct, including a series of articles in 
a key practitioner journal (Colley et al., 2008; Colley and Lewin, 2008; Colley et al., 2010b), 
presentations at practitioner conferences, short briefings and working papers, and seminars aimed 
at those audiences. 
Feedback of interim findings was provided to senior managers of the three case-study services with 
which we were working, which already demonstrated the problems encountered by PAs.  The weight 
of the evidence we had was substantial.  Not just the principle of academic freedom, but also our 
ethical obligations under BERA’s own code of practice (BERA 2011) demanded that we did not 
withhold data that might be unpalatable.  However, whilst one senior manager was very supportive 
of the research, and attempted (unsuccessfully) to use it to influence the restructuring of 
Connexions as it was devolved to that local authority, responses from the other two services were 
quite different.  One service responded with a vigorous email protest about the feedback, but when 
we met to discuss this with them, they acknowledged the validity of the findings while expressing 
their disappointment about them.  They also decided to withdraw some of their own data (we had 
also interviewed two senior managers in each of the three services) for fear of repercussions within 
the local authority, as their own posts were now under threat.  From the third service, we received 
no reply or further communication from managers, despite attempts to follow up the interim report 
with them.  The response from the practitioners who had participated was extremely enthusiastic.  
They expressed strong satisfaction that the realities of their work were being given a voice which 
they believed would have to be heard.  A letter about the research published in the Guardian as well 
as articles in the practitioner journal brought more emails from other PAs nationally, and similar 
responses emerged in the dissemination seminars and conference presentations we held, 
welcoming our findings as resonant with their own experiences.  I was also consulted by PAs in three 
other Connexions services and their trade unions, to help them produce documentation to support 
their struggles against downgrading and salary cuts, and later against redundancy.  This support had 
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to remain confidential, however, as the PAs were forbidden by their services from making the details 
of local authority decisions on these matters public. 
After completing the research, it was clear that Connexions was disintegrating as a service in the 
context of local authority austerity measures.  As a marginal service, competing for funds now with 
more high-profile local authority agendas such as child protection, it took the brunt of initial 
cutbacks.  This made the prospects somewhat bleak for achieving research ‘impact’ in the sense 
emphasised by Gardner (2011).  Our research had not ‘chimed’ with the interests of policy makers 
and implementers, since it made visible the negative consequences of the Connexions strategy; and 
its recommendations for improving the service – and the prospects of the young people it was not 
serving well – fell on deaf ears.  How could it possibly ‘chime’ with the change in their interests?  
How could those interests be arbitrated as ‘reasonable’ or otherwise without taking into account 
findings such as ours?   
Nevertheless, we became more optimistic as an invitation came first from the Department for 
Education and Skills (DfES) to present our findings to policy leads and researchers in this area, which 
seemed to be warmly received; leading to a further invitation to present our findings as evidence to 
a newly-formed national commission looking at professional issues in this area of work.  The latter 
was populated largely by senior managers and stakeholders across different sectors, including some 
senior figures in Connexions: that is to say, by people who were also implementing government 
policy and managing PAs.   
Not surprisingly, then, we encountered considerable hostility as we presented our findings.  Some of 
this hostility consisted of heated denials and declarations that such things did not go on in ‘their’ 
service (although classroom discussions in my teaching with students employed in one of the 
represented services suggested strongly that very similar things did go on).  Some consisted of 
indignant attempts to brand the research participants as being unfit to practice.  Some, predictably 
perhaps, consisted of attempts to denigrate the research through ill-informed attacks on its 
methodology (see Browne, 2010, and Goode, 2006 for similar accounts of this practice).  Indeed, one 
opponent argued that our findings should not be accepted as evidence by the commission at all on 
this basis.  In these respects, we found ourselves meeting the same response that the PAs 
participating in our research had recounted.  Eventually, our research was listed as evidence in the 
commission’s report, but not cited within it – thus undermining any claim in ‘REF’ terms for ‘impact’.   
Meanwhile, a change of government had taken place, the interested parties at the DfES had moved 
on, and Michael Gove, the education minister, had made it clear that resources would no longer be 
allocated by his new department to this area of work.  At the same time, I continued to receive 
emails from practitioners still attempting to work in this field, or now conducting their own research, 
testifying to the positive personal impact the research had created for them by representing as a 
public issue what had so often been experienced by them only as private troubles (cf. Wright Mills, 
1959/2000). Such subtle impact is, of course, almost impossible to quantify or to evidence (Parker 
and van Teijlingen, 2012).  Moreover, the confidential nature of the support provided to trade 
unions defending PAs’ jobs and conditions meant that could not be made public.  This places us thus 
in a disadvantaged position in the field of educational research, which now demands measures of 
‘impact’ as an indication of the quality of our work.  
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This, then, is a narrative not of ‘impact’, nor of failure of ‘impact’, but of the refusal of ‘impact’ by 
powerful players in the field we studied; and of its potential consequences in the field of educational 
research: the ways in which the quality of that work might be judged within the terms of the REF and 
of the Research Councils’ criteria for funding and assessing research.  Here I leave aside the 
difficulties of achieving ‘impact’ in the disappearing field of youth support work, important though 
that is.  Instead, I focus on analysing this refusal of ‘impact’ using Bourdieu’s theoretical tools, and 
illusio in particular, to interpret the fate of our work in the field of educational research.   
Competing illusios
2
 and the fetish of ‘impact’ 
Call me naïve (or indeed, old-fashioned), but from my initial entry into the field of educational 
research, I have always wanted my research to ‘make a difference’ to real lives.  I believe that such 
differences can be made by educational researchers exposing and challenging the mechanisms by 
which social injustice is produced and reproduced, and by which symbolic and material violence is 
done to oppressed groups.  To name these mechanisms and render them visible is a contribution I 
can make to struggles against them, from my current location within the academy.  My research is 
therefore unashamedly critical, since it starts from a prima facie recognition that social inequalities 
are endemic in capitalist society, and is driven by values and purposes that seek a radical 
transformation of society to end such inequalities.  This is my illusio, my passionate and committed 
investment in the field of educational research, which is inextricably linked to a lifetime habitus – 
mostly developed outside the academy – of socialist-feminist beliefs and activities.   
This has not always been easy, but it has until now been possible for myself and many others 
committed to the same kind of illusio within the field of educational research.  Clearly it did not ever 
fit the dominant illusio, which has long been the mantra of ‘what works’ (Hodkinson, 2008). But 
there was space in the field for such critical research, and I believe that it did have positive impact, 
although probably not easily measurable. The introduction of the ‘impact’ agenda by research 
councils and HEFCE, driven by government influence, represents a significant change in the field (cf. 
Grenfell and James, 1998) in terms of the stakes we have to play for: a change imposed by powerful 
social and economic groups.  To be deemed to be doing ‘excellent research’, we now have to 
demonstrate excellent ‘impact’, albeit within a definition that is (as the contesting views reviewed 
above have shown) at one and the same time vague and narrowly rigid.   
The imposition of ‘impact’ as a criterion of research quality can be understood as an ‘officializing 
strategy’ (Bourdieu, 1977) aimed at creating new regularities of practice.  Those regularities require 
research to be conceived, developed, implemented and disseminated in line with the interests of 
‘users’.  But ‘users’ are not a homogenous group.  The practitioners, young people, parents and 
communities affected by the decimation of Connexions had few if any interests in common with the 
local and national politicians denying the service resources and imposing inappropriate and 
unfeasible targets; nor with the senior and middle managers pressurising practitioners to engage in 
unethical behaviour in order to try and meet those inappropriate targets with inadequate resources.  
As Widin (2010) reminds us, different groups bring different and competing interests to their play in 
the field, and some dominate others.  In this case, it is the same dominant groups – policy makers 
and implementers – that privileged their interests over service users’ interests who are also 
                                                          
2
 The grammatically correct plural of illusio is illusiones, but I have opted for a less grammatical form in order 
to avoid conflating it with the English term ‘illusions’. 
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appropriating the right to decide which interests are ‘reasonable’ for our research to ‘chime’ with, 
and which are not.  Thus the object of the ‘officialising strategy’ of ‘impact’ is to transform the 
particular interests of these dominant groups into legitimate and generalised interests which appear 
to be the only reasonable ones.  This is at the same time accompanied by a disavowal of interest 
(Widin, 2010), the appearance of disinterestedness (Bourdieu, 1977), and the obfuscation of actual 
interests through the appeal to ‘common sense’ and the public good.  Being in favour of ‘impact’ is 
thus constructed as akin to voting for good and against evil.  How could anyone not agree? 
But as public debates about ‘impact’ have revealed, some interpret these ‘disinterested’ interests as 
the creeping privatisation of higher education, others as the silencing of critical voices, yet others as 
a broader political attack on public intellectuals.  I have heard colleagues express the view that a 
major aim of the REF, including the ‘impact’ criterion, is not to enhance the quality of research, but 
in fact to justify the further restriction of research funding whilst ensuring that what remains is 
concentrated in a small number of elite institutions.  Should these interpretations be even partially 
justified, we are facing a radical rupture in our field. 
As we encountered in the hostile reception of our research by the government commission and 
senior managers of Connexions, the corollary of this move by powerful players is to marginalise and 
disparage those who do not agree; who continue to play by the old rules, in which oppositional 
research was subordinate but tolerated; and who cling to an illusio now rendered illegitimate within 
the field (Bourdieu, 1984).  Our habitus finds itself beset by ‘hysteresis’, lagging behind the times, 
increasingly out of kilter with the new stakes in the field, and our already-marginal goods are further 
devalued (Bourdieu, 1984).  But the durable aspects of my habitus refuse to be transposed 
(Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992) in line with the ‘endless drive’ for ‘ever newer objects’ of value 
(Bourdieu, 1984: 249) in the educational research field.  My choices are limited by the actions of 
other, more powerful players in the field, and also by the pale of my own habitus (cf. Reay, 2004). 
To complete this analysis, I argue that ‘impact’ – as constructed by the government, its paymasters, 
and its servants (the research councils and HEFCE) – far from being a reasonable requirement that 
no excellent researcher could refuse, in fact constitutes a classic example of the fetish.  The official 
discourse of ‘impact’ reifies its validity as a criterion for judging research, portraying it as natural, 
intrinsic and unquestionable.  At the same time, it serves to obscure the hierarchical social relations 
which exist within the field of higher education, between Russell Group, ‘red brick’ and post-1992 
universities, between conformative and critical researchers, and (outside the academy) between 
different groups of research users.  It pretends that the allocation of research resources have 
nothing to do with the vested interests of political, economic and academic elites.  It de-historicises 
our understanding of the direction that research funding policy is taking, and attempts to divorce it 
from the far wider influence of neo-liberal policies at a time of global economic crisis.  As Bourdieu 
and Wacquant note, the constitution of such a fetish is ‘the properly social magic of institutions’ 
(1992: 117).   
A reflexive conclusion 
For Bourdieu, reflexivity is perhaps the most crucial element of social science; not a narcissistic 
reflexivity, but one in which social scientists are obliged to question the rules of the game they 
themselves are playing as they construct it, and constructing as they play it.  It is the application of 
‘radical doubt’ to the core endeavours of the academy (Bourdieu, 1992b).  It demands critical 
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scrutiny of the interests avowed by the leadership of the educational research community, and 
promoted on behalf of our learned society, BERA.  And it questions any easy conformity with the 
imposition of new stakes and the reinforcement thereby of powerful and inequitable interests in our 
field. 
There is, of course, also an obligation to individual reflexivity.  In this paper, I have displayed some of 
my own ‘dirty linen’.  My account of trying to create impact with my research, and of finding its 
‘impact’ refused by powerful opponents, could be read in quite a different way.  It could be held up 
as evidence of the poor quality of my research itself; or of my efforts to disseminate it.  Questions 
could be asked about how I might have got a better hearing for the research, engaged key 
stakeholders more positively, tried harder, done ‘what works’.  There is, in my story, a risk of 
‘caught-between-ness’ or ‘caught-out-ness’, an awareness of my lack of ‘the sense of a good 
investment which dictates a withdrawal from outmoded, or simply devalued objects, places or 
practices…’ (Bourdieu, 1984: 249). In mitigation, therefore, I want to end my presentation with a 
passage quoted in Rawolle and Lingard (in press), and to hope that its final prediction proves correct: 
A research presentation is in every respect the very opposite of an exhibition, of a show in 
which you seek to show off and to impress others. It is a discourse in which you expose 
yourself, you take risks. … The more you expose yourself, the greater your chances of 
benefiting from the discussion and the more constructive and good-willed, I am sure, the 
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